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A World in Economic Crisis* 
 
Johan Galtung** 
 
1. An introduction to hyper-capitalism 
We live in an era of hyper-capitalism so absurd, judged by how negative 
consequences turn into crisis, that there is only one safe prediction: this is not 
going to last. What comes in its place, the successor era, is another matter; 
interestingly, the intellectual managers of hyper-capitalism have little to say.1 
 
By "hyper-capitalism" is meant an economic system with capital as its (almost) 
unique raison d'etre, as means/input, goal/output, and measure/indicator: wealth 
(private, corporate); GNP (for the productive national economy, probably soon 
Yielding2 to GGP, the Gross Global Product); DJI, the Dow Jones Index and 
similar indexes3 from other stock exchanges (for the finance economy); their 
averages, their growth rates. 
 
A metaphor may be useful to fathom the depth of our crisis. Individually or 
collectively, as children, adolescents, adults, parents, we are concerned with the 
development of human beings, ourselves or others. For infants, for the starving, 
for some patients, it makes sense to look at humans as a body to be fed, and 
measure development in the material terms of food input and weight output, 
using output/input ratios as a measure of ability to avoid waste. The 
consequences of "hyper-foodism" are obvious: there is not only a floor, 
minimum weight, to be respected but also a ceiling, a maximum weight beyond 
which negative side-effects will dominate. So much for the body. But – what 
happened to the human mind, the human spirit, to people absorbed by weight-
consciousness, oscillating between anorexia and bulimia?4 
 
Hyper-capitalism blocks out the concerns for material floor and material ceiling 
and for what happens to mind and spirit. A minimum level of wealth, or 
purchasing power, is needed, if the basic need-objects have to be bought. 
Regardless of economic system, there is a minimum level for the satisfaction of 
basic somatic needs for clean food/water/air, clothing, housing, health care, 
                                                          
* This paper was presented by professor Johan Galtung at a Seminar organized by DIR in 
Aalborg, Denmark the 3 May, 2002 with the title ”Globalization and the ’Nonkilling 
Economy’”.The author would like to acknowledge the valuable comments by participants in 
seminars where this paper has been presented, particularly at Ritsumeikan University 4 
November 1998 and at Universitaet Witten/Herdecke 9 December 1998; particularly Akifumi 
Fujita. I am also as always very grateful for comments by Dietrich Fischer, and for comments 
by Ash Amin. The paper was written when the author was Fellow at the Swedish College for 
Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences, Uppsala, Spring 1999. 
** Johan Galtung is Professor of Peace Studies, University of Hawaii and Director of 
TRANSCEND (Peace and Development Network). 
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below which morbidity and mortality increase rapidly. There is misery, not 
poverty.5 And there is a maximum level of satisfaction of basic somatic needs, 
beyond which more food, clothing, housing, health care rapidly become 
counterproductive. 
 
However, is there also a maximum level of wealth/GNP/DJI? This is a major 
and so far unanswered question in economics. Economic systems with some 
hyper-rich individuals often also have many who live in misery. If the rather rich 
(RR) are rich because others are pretty poor (PP, living in misery, with basic 
needs not met), and/or vice versa, then there is room for the argument that RR 
have exceeded their limit as PP have theirs. But we would probably have to 
show mechanisms whereby bringing RR below the maximum would bring PP 
above the minimum. In the Muslim world this mechanism is known as zakat, in 
the Christian world as samaritanism, in the Buddhist world as metta karuna.6 
Another form is progressive taxation, democratically decided upon or not, 
converting excess wealth into free or subsidized objects (food, clothes, shelter) 
for the most needy. Among countries the voluntary form of distribution is 
practiced as development assistance. The mandatory form is discussed as global 
taxation, like assessment to UN organizations. The big question is whether 
mandatory imposition of a maximum reduces the ability of the system to 
generate wealth distributed or not. 
 
We do not need to take a stand on this question. Whether economic activity is 
measured as wealth, GNP, DJI, or by any other measure, the average and the 
distribution are two position coordinates for an economic system. When asked 
"what is the geographical position of me/my country/ my stock exchange", a 
geographer who only answers in terms of latitude is not useful; we expect the 
longitude to follow immediately. An economist who answers "what is the 
economic position of my economy - my country's economy/my stock exchange" 
only with averages or absolute values, no distribution measures or relative 
values, is an equally useless economist. From a meteorologist we demand not 
only the average amount of sunshine/rain tomorrow; we would also like to know 
on whom the sun shines and on whom not, where the rain falls. If not, give us 
another meteorologist. 
 
A typical symptom of hyper-capitalism is exactly7 the attention to capital, and 
absence of attention to human beings; the attention to averages and absence of 
attention to measures of distribution - including simple measures like the 
purchasing power ratio between the top and the bottom 20%, the 20/20 ratio (or 
20RR/20PP ratio).8  It is down at the bottom 20% (or less, usually more) that the 
failure of an economic system shows up as the crisis of misery. But neither that, 
nor the less dramatic distribution measures, are reported in today's (often) 
corporate media. Reported are problems of capital accumulation among the top 
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20% (or more, usually less), particularly in the finance economy since they have 
sufficient purchasing power to acquire (much) more products than needed to 
satisfy their basic needs, the necessities. They can buy not only "normal goods", 
let us call them normalities, but even luxuries. 
 
Any fool can build an economic system where rich people buy expensive 
products: needed is only the infrastructure for seller and buyer to meet so that 
products (used for consumption) can be exchanged for financial objects (used 
for buying and selling, including each other, such as precious metals, currencies, 
stocks, bonds, options, futures, derivatives, and any future result of financial 
differentiation, deepening). The products have to be produced, and there has to 
be compensation for the production factors: natural resources (including 
energy), labor, capital, technology, management; but the last three translate into 
interest, fees and salaries for capitalists, engineers and managers, themselves RR 
or at least R (rich). The wages for labor can be kept below minimum (to stay out 
of misery) through contract work, or the labor is abroad, and modern products 
are less resource-intensive than before (compare communication chips with 
electro-mechanical machines for transportation). 
 
This is an image of what happens in Third World I (Latin America/Caribbean, 
Africa, Asia/Pacific) and Third World II, the former socialist countries, 
particularly ex-Soviet Union. Consumer products are imported; natural 
resources and financial objects are exported. The cycles pass through R and RR; 
P and PP are excluded and M, the middle class, dwindles. 
 
What requires talent is to build an economy with basic somatic needs met for 
(almost) everybody, with a good supply of normalities and luxuries on top of 
easily available necessities; with due consideration to the mental/spiritual needs 
for freedom and identity. We do not want forced feeding/clothing/housing from 
above. Humans want human dignity. That excludes commando socialism. And it 
excludes commando hyper-capitalism.9  
 
2. On economic systems and economic crises in general 
The economy (the economic system) can be conceived of as having two parts: 
the product economy, producing products, goods and services; and the finance 
economy based on financial objects. 
 
The product economy is a system of production-distribution-consumption cycles 
that produces products (goods and services) from factors of production (natural 
resources, labor; capital, technology, management), distributes them through the 
market in exchange for other products or financial objects, and consumes them 
till end consumption turns the product into waste and no further (human) 
consumption is possible. The products can be divided into necessities that 
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humans must consume to be human, normalities that most or many consume (a 
watch, a radio) and luxuries that are neither necessary nor normal, but consumed 
by the few, and demanded by them precisely for that reason.10 
 
Along the economic cycles there may now be enrichment or depletion/pollution 
of human and non-human nature, basic human needs may be met or not, the 
structure and culture of society, and the world society of societies, may be 
enriched or impoverished. The process may or may not be sustainable over time 
depending on the net balance of all the above, noting that some (side-)effects 
may be terminal for the system (like massive depletion /pollution 
/revolution/migration). 
 
The finance economy is a system of buying-selling cycles of financial objects, 
characterized by no end consumption. Along the cycles the object may 
appreciate or depreciate.  Any product can become a financial object, like 
paintings, cars, bought for selling when the price is right, not for 
using/consuming.  But we usually think of precious metals, currencies, bonds 
and stocks.11 
 
Broadening expands the geographical domain of the cycles till they cover the 
whole globe (globalization); deepening differentiates the range of products and 
objects. We witness broadening and deepening of both product and finance 
economies; adding to the latter hedge funds, options, futures, derivatives. 
 
The macro-economy sees the economy as a system of interlocking cycles of 
products and objects; in the micro-economy the individual and collective 
decision-making is made visible. 
 
At this simple level of reasoning some major, crisis-prone, problems of 
economic systems can easily be identified. Even if an economic system can take 
on a life of its own, as can also a malignant tumor, there are three common-
sense guidelines: 
 
A: Consumption presupposes consumption of necessities. 
 
B. The productive economy presupposes consumption. 
 
C. The finance economy presupposes the productive economy. 
 
The finance economy is meaningless without a productive economy, the 
productive economy is meaningless without consumption, and the consumption 
is meaningless without basic consumption to meet basic needs. This sounds 
trivial, but the consequences are not. Turn it around: "we meet basic needs in 
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order to consume more"; "we consume in order to sustain the productive 
economy"; "we produce in order to sustain the finance economy" and we run 
into a hyper-capitalist discourse which sees capital, not humans, not even the 
state or the nation, as the measure of all things. The media reporting on the crisis 
write and talk as if they have bought into that discourse at the expense of 
everything else. Stock exchanges, not factories and fields, are the major foci; 
human beings are left out completely. Easily done for those who can take 
necessities, normalities and even luxuries for granted. 
 
From (A, B) and (B, C) above follow two ways in which an economy can go 
wrong because of lack of balance/synchrony:  
 
Imbalance/asynchrony between production and consumption: 
 
-underproduction relative to consumption, especially 
-underproduction of necessities 
-overproduction relative to consumption 
 
Imbalance/asynchrony between finance and productive economy: 
 
-finance economy under-finances productive economy, especially 
-finance economy under-finances production of necessities 
-finance economy over-finances productive economy 
 
To this can be added the problems of distribution: oversupply of some products 
and undersupply of others at the access points, well known to any shopper in 
any shop in any system. What we are talking about, however, are major 
imbalances not due to malfunctioning of distribution systems, but to deeper 
causes. 
 
The present world economy suffers from all four crises: 
 
CRISIS I:  undersupply of affordable necessities 
 
CRISIS II: underfinancing of necessities production 
 
CRISIS III: oversupply of normalities and luxuries 
 
CRISIS IV: overfinancing of normalities and luxuries 
 
The general expressions of these problems are well known: 
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CRISIS I: People who cannot afford necessities starve, fall ill and die; the prices 
go up because of undersupply (inflation). 
 
CRISIS II: Credit underavailable for basic needs production considered non-
profitable; affordable prices do not cover costs. 
 
CRISIS III: People cannot match supply with demand, the prices go down 
because of the oversupply (deflation); bankruptcies. 
 
CRISIS IV: Credit overavailable for non-basic needs production; financial 
objects - money/bonds/stocks - lose value (bad credits). 
 
Along the disjunction between production and consumption people die, 
companies die. Along the disjunction between the finance and productive 
economies necessities are underfinanced. What is underdemanded is 
overfinanced, and financial objects lose value. 
 
It is interesting to watch how differentially these problems have been treated by 
the media-. As pointed out above, most of the attention is on Crisis III and Crisis 
IV, the crises suffered by the owners of companies and holders of financial 
objects. That full employment is losing to underemployment (contract jobs) and 
unemployment (no job at all) is mentioned. But the implications for the 
satisfaction of employee basic needs, Crisis I, are rarely explored. Nor is Crisis 
II explored, because financing of something non-profitable is seen as even more 
absurd than people starving in a world of plenty. Only Providence, private 
providers or l'etat provident, none of them believed in by corporate media, are 
expected to do such a thing. Economic crisis is seen as crisis at the top, not at 
the bottom. 
 
But will Crisis III/IV at the top not produce Crisis I/II at the bottom? In a 
globalized and privatized world economy, yes, but not in a more diverse world 
economy with an intact, local subsistence economy at the bottom. It all depends 
on the degree of coupling across state, nation, class, generation and gender 
borders. The higher the coupling, the higher the crisis linkage. Thus, an 
increasing proportion of the population with decreasing purchasing power 
means decreasing demand and not only for necessities, but also for normalities 
(for luxuries there will always be that small, closed, market described above). 
 
So Crisis I/II also produces Crisis III/IV at the top. An obvious response at the 
top is fusion, joining companies together so that they can eliminate not only 
employees but also competition, and fix prices so as to become less vulnerable. 
Thus, some corruption, particularly in Japan, may be to save the company rather 
than the private manager/employee, the corruptor. 
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A more global and holistic view of the crisis is needed to avoid some 
elementary, and very ubiquitous, analytical mistakes. But that presupposes 
analysts inside and outside the media that do not reify "the economy", and do 
not view the economy with the eyes of those able to pay for their analytical 
services only. 
 
If the economy is an iceberg then some of the stock exchange behavior is the 
part made visible. The value of currencies, bond and stock, and the more exotic 
financial objects, gain and lose relative to each other; trajectories show cycles 
(bullish, bearish), linear declines (crises), and sharp falls (crashes). Analysts will 
relate trajectories in the same economy (stock exchange), and across economies, 
noting imbalances/asynchronies (e.g. in the cash flow). Metaphors, like 
dominoes and epidemics, are used to imply causality. No doubt there are such 
effects within and between finance economies. But eyes trained only on the top 
of the iceberg will even indulge in discourses about the"Asian Crisis": it 
"started" in Thailand, then "it" went on to South Korea and Indonesia - maybe 
Malaysia - China is the next to fall, Japan has been ill for a long time. The time 
perspectives limited. Analysts talking like that seem to have forgotten the 
chronic "Russian/ex-Soviet Crisis", the "Mexican Crisis" of 1994, and that a 
"USA Crisis" was identified in the 1980s and beyond.  This virus, the "Crisis", 
has at the time of writing moved to Brazil, and seems to be thriving. "It" will 
move on. 
 
Of course this is a 10% analysis due to a limited viewing angle and a narrow 
discourse. Look at the total economy, and take globalization sufficiently 
seriously to see the world as one economic system (with subsystems), and we 
might be able to identify some of the common factors in that invisible 90% 
mass. 
 
3. On the hyper-capitalism crisis: the independent cluster 
We are dealing with a conjunction of factors, and it would be misleading to do 
what many do, use "globalization" to cover the causal burden alone. But 
globalization certainly matters, and more particularly in its dynamic expression, 
as 
 
[1] Increasing globalization: global market penetration by corporations that 
under the WTO regime (Uruguay Round) are truly transnational (not merely 
multi-national), making state borders and national origin irrelevant. Of course 
this has consequences. 
 
For one thing, in spite of superb networking and real time decision-making, the 
world is not only big, but also complex, making global and holistic analyses 
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difficult. We would expect more imbalances/asynchronies in the 
consumption/production and the production/finance interfaces across such huge 
distances in space and time, not to mention in social (= structural+cultural) 
space. Even in a local village market there may be an excess, or a deficit of 
products at the end of the day, and prices may go down or up. The money-lender 
may have given credit insufficiently informed by heart and/or brain. How then 
about the nation, the state, the region, the world? 
 
The Soviet answer was to impose balance through planning, diktat; in practice 
focusing on production only, disregarding consumer demand except for 
necessities (this was the strong point); and on the production economy only. The 
approach was reductionist, assuming the primacies of necessities and of 
production. But the hyper-capitalist way is also reductionist (therein lies its 
commando character): supply-side monetarism gives primacy to 
production/supply over consumption/demand and to the finance economy over 
the productive economy. 
 
The consequences in terms of overproduction, relative to demand backed up by 
purchasing power, and undersupply of necessities because they are not 
"demanded", but only needed, are obvious, as are also short-term gains for 
financiers and managers. But here we have another perspective: reductionism as 
a response to information overload. Globalization makes the economy even 
more of a morass; some simple guiding principles are needed. The Soviet 
economy used "State interests first, then human needs", by implementing the 
Plan. The hyper-capitalists use "finance economy first, with stable currencies in 
space (no fluctuation in currency rates) and time (no inflation) over time (no 
fluctuation); then a productive world Market economy driven by egoistic cost-
benefit." The Marxists reified the Plan and the liberals the Market, as 
expressions of the will of the masses/buyers-sellers, when in reality both could 
easily be manipulated by a handful of people (and in fact were and are). 
 
Second, Smithian, globalizing Anglo-Saxon markets penetrate not only the 
borders between states (eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers), between 
nations (reducing taste differences), center and periphery (reaching the most 
remote corner/village, spearheaded by Coca Cola), classes (only with purchasing 
power), the genders (reducing gender differences in economic behavior), but 
also the border between monetized and non-monetized markets, and between 
growth and subsistence economies. Local markets are destroyed with mass-
produced, cheap goods, and the subsistence, non-monetized economies by 
buying/destroying the necessary factors of production, such as land and other 
natural resources. National monetized markets started this process, regional 
economies continued, global markets destroy what little is left. 
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This has an interesting implication for the position of the national elites. As 
national markets expanded from the national centers and the economic cycles 
covered the national territory, the local economic cycles contracted. 
Autonomous local producers, distributors and consumers became cogs in 
machineries fueled from the center. Local sales points were still needed, but the 
center could market directly. From one end of the country to the other 
consumers bought the same products, produced and distributed by the same 
national companies. But now, from one end of the world to the other consumers 
will buy the same products produced and distributed by the same world 
companies, and just as mail orders became common in the national economy, e-
mail orders will take over in the global economy. That will weaken the position 
of the local bridgeheads in the old multi-national structures, just as nation 
building weakened the positions of the local economic boss. They may leave for 
the Center, become employees in a TNC, or join the paupers. At any rate, the 
theory of imperialism will have to be rewritten.12 
 
This, incidentally also holds for national State elites: if a major function of the 
State is to facilitate or control (depending on whether the system is capitalist or 
socialist) Capital, then facilitation/control has to be done at the Center, and the 
Center moved from the local to the national, and then to the region (such as 
Frankfurt) and to the world (such as Washington DC). And this throws us back 
to the first point above: local and national specific competence has to yield to 
regional and global general principles, making the system even more exposed to 
imbalances/synchronies hard to foretell. There will be less local/national 
capacity to dampen the impact. 
 
[2] Increasing privatization: economic cycles are reshunted so that they do not 
pass through the state. State enterprises with the state responsible for production 
and distribution of the goods and services (railroad transportation, PTT 
communication, health delivery, punishment delivery and schooling), are 
increasingly privatized. Cycles passing through the state for some managerial 
role, such as licensing, may also be reshunted. As borders disappear so do duties 
for anything passing borders. Corporations and citizens still pay taxes and 
receive in return the services of l'etat gendarme, but with the state giving less the 
arguments for the state taking less13 are strong, including the arguments for a flat 
tax, like the sales tax. The state is increasingly deprived of utilitarian, 
contractual power, the power of the carrot, and left with the power of the stick 
and whatever moral persuasion the state may be able to mobilize. 
 
The consequences of stripping the state naked are many 
First, with all its inefficiency, clumsiness, even blunt authoritarianism beyond 
bureaucratic arrogance, the state is the most effective mechanism for distribution 
known to the modern social formation based on the tripod of State, Capital and 
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Civil Society. Capital, in the modern form of the corporation, is well suited for 
economic growth measured by capital accumulation one way or the other. But 
left to itself it creates inequalities and inequities, and recently seems to abolish 
more employment than it creates, as evidenced by the generally rising rates of 
under- and unemployment.14 Civil Society may provide solidarity and shelter, 
literally speaking, and has great potential if local authorities (LAs) and peoples' 
organizations (NGOs) could cooperate building local economies. But we are not 
there, yet. 
 
The State has had two major mechanisms at its disposal:  
 
- the welfare state, providing necessities through free health and education 
services and insurance against unemployment, disease and old age (and 
subsidized food, clothing and housing). The welfare state was financed by 
customs duties, taxation (more or less progressive), sales taxes, luxury taxes, etc. 
 
- countercyclical investment, keynesianism, presupposing willingness to invest 
when the market was at its worst to provide the unemployed with wages that 
could be spent on necessities and normalities, keeping the economic wheels 
turning (and meeting their needs for whatever dignity the work offered). 
 
With less state revenue available for distribution through subsidized necessities, 
keynesian counter-cyclical investment etc., we would expect the distribution to 
deteriorate and rising proportions of the lower ranges to sink into the syndrome 
of under/unemployment and misery, also in the MDCs (more developed 
countries). There are already alarming reports about low tax revenue, the 
prediction being that this is going to get worse.15 The MDC state can no longer 
afford the welfare state, presenting increasingly poor citizens with increasingly 
agonizing choices. 
 
One particular reason for lower revenue relates to the interface with 
globalization.  Products, resources, (migrant) labor, capital and technology have 
always been mobile, including across borders,16 what is new is the mobility of 
the whole factory, including (much of) the management. The decision is, of 
course, based not only on the distance to natural resources and markets, on the 
Q/P (quality over price) of labor, but also on taxation. Today not only low or 
zero taxes, but negative taxes, incentives, are demanded - and offered. Why not 
relocate? 
 
[3] Increasing stock-holder power: shifting profit away from the workers and 
towards the stock-holders. This is "privatization within the privatization". A 
company rests on five pillars: 
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- the customers, exchanging money for company products; 
- the workers, exchanging labor for money (wages)/products; 
- the managers, divided into administrative and technical. 
- the capital-holders (stock-holders), investing in the company; 
 
In the background is nature, depleted, polluted, unrepresented 
Much of the theory and practice of the company can be seen in terms of shifting 
alliances. Strengthen the bond between workers and management and we get the 
Japanese company, sharing the ups and downs of the company, fortified through 
life-long employment and seniority promotion. The workers take out more (as 
bonus) the more time and work they put in, so do managers. Rotate workers and 
management and we get one of the Chinese experiments during the Cultural 
Revolution. Abolish managers, substitute the State, and we get the Soviet model. 
Strengthen the tie to the customers and we get the cooperative, with the 
customers taking out more (as bonus) the more money they put in. Workers 
strike, or customers boycott, and that may spell the end 
 
In the hyper-capitalist era capital is the major input and output, so capital-
holders feel entitled to take out more money as dividends the more they put in 
buying stock. The ratio17 earning/price should be high and increasing, the 
company should offer products high on Q/P, the only thing to cut are employee 
wages. What they want is downsizing of workers and upsizing of earnings; what 
they get can get as a class is under/unemployed people craving for necessities, 
and not for profitable luxuries and normalities. Sawing off the branch they sit 
on? 
 
[4] Increasing labor productivity: substituting automation for routine work, an 
example being computers for secretaries. At the root of this is a simple equation, 
true by definition: 
 
Production = Productivity x No. of employees x No. of hours 
 
(dividing we get the definition of labor productivity). If now labor productivity 
increases we get the following possibilities if overproduction, relative to 
demand, is to be avoided: 
 
I. Production/output/supply can be increased, because of 
 
- elimination of competition (fusion, oligopoly, monopoly) 
 
- increasing demand (increasing purchasing power, because of more consumers 
and/or more money available per consumer). 
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II. Production/output/supply cannot be increased, leading to 
 
- decreasing no. of employees, downsizing, unemployment, 
 
- decreasing no. of hours, shorter days/weeks/months/years/lives (more study, 
more retirement), contract work, underemployment. Reality is, of course, a mix 
of all of this, depending on time, space, circumstances and branches. Given the 
preceding factor, more money to the capital-holders, there would be readiness to 
choose. [II] In order to engage in [I]: fusing companies, downsizing, farming out 
contract work with no social costs to pay. The net result is less purchasing 
power, even for necessities. What is rational for one company is irrational for 
the company class.  
 
If the supply goes where the demand is, then we would expect a general shift in 
production away from necessities to normalities and luxuries. Ocean fishing and 
fish farming will switch toward the expensive varieties (salmon, lobsters, etc.), 
away from the common consumer's simple seafood, and the same will probably 
happen in agriculture (less factor input for staples, more for luxury outputs like 
tropical fruits.) 
 
There is one obvious road out of the problem, the road not traveled: decrease the 
(labor) productivity. In principle this could open for more employment, more 
wages to more people, more purchasing power, more sales, more revenue. But it 
would obviously run against the interests of the technology-holders, whose task 
it is to substitute capital for labor via technology. They have more power in the 
average company after the staying power of employees through strikes 
decreased with increasing tendency to lay them off anyhow (exception: 
employees who are "indispensable", like flight leaders, pilots, energy operators, 
ambulance drivers). Moreover, technology is more in harmony with the Zeitgeist 
and its idea of progress; not more low-skill work, but progress defined as 
automation/robotization and high-skill work.  The typical response of the system 
would be retraining of adults and encouragement to acquire higher level of 
education. As higher education is transformed from luxury for the leisured 
classes via normality to necessity, the demand for education will become 
increasingly inelastic, and the fees will go up for something the state cannot 
afford to offer free anyhow. 
 
In the meantime increasing labor productivity will probably proceed at a higher 
pace than the production of high-skill labor that can be gainfully employed; in 
other words, more people will be defined as redundant than those who will find 
employment. 
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Behind this another factor is lurking: the "dangerous classes", meaning the 
working classes. By tying wages to labor productivity, offering wage increase if 
productivity increases, the working classes have been paid to abolish 
themselves. It does not take much empathy to understand how demoralizing this 
has been for the last generation or so. We are still there. 
 
[5] Increasing production of mainstream economists: making the blind spots of 
their economistic discourse private and public policy. If we have the economics 
we deserve, compatible with our (Western) deep culture, then we would expect 
the usual tendency toward abstraction of "the economic" away from other 
factors, generalization in time and space, and reification. We would expect a 
paradigm built around the key measurable variable: capital, and its equivalents.18 
We would expect blindness to all other spaces, defining what happens there as 
"externalities":19 - Nature is seen as resources for humans, not as sui generis 
 
- Self is seen as somatic/material pain/pleasure, not spiritual 
 
- Society is seen as a market for egoistic cost-benefit action 
 
- World is seen as a market for national cost-benefit interest 
 
- Culture is seen as irrelevant, economics is space-invariant 
 
- Time is seen as irrelevant, economics is time-invariant 
 
What remains is a pyramidal, axiomatic paradigm with the primacy of economic 
growth as Axiom No. 1, to be achieved through industrialism (at the expense of 
Nature), individual materialism (at the expense of spiritual qualities), egoistic 
competition (at the expense of solidarity), comparative advantages (at the 
expense of freezing the division of labor), endless growth (at the expense of a 
finite world), mathematization (at the expense of subtleness, ambiguity) and 
GNP/GGP as the new God (at the expense of all the others). 
 
The costs of giving power to economists as discourse-holders, the tremendous 
mistakes and lack of foresight, are compensated by the benefits: a clear, cosmic 
goal in a chaotic world, at the same time compatible with elite interests. “Die 
herrschende Ideologie is die Ideologie der herrschenden Klasse.” 
 
[6] Increasing synergy among these factors due to the IMF, together with the 
World Bank and other US-steered, WDC-based Bretton Woods institutions, 
nominally of the United Nations.20 The IMF,21 like the smaller members of the 
family, has taken upon itself the D,P,T role of coming up with the diagnosis, 
prognosis and therapy for ailing economies. However, in the medicine chest 
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there is only one medicine (a good reason for being skeptical): removal of all 
constraints on capital-holders: 
 
- globalization, the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers, crowned by a 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, possibly the last document to be signed 
by states before they wither away22 (before revolution in capitalist countries, 
after in socialist): 
 
- privatization, removing the state as an economic actor, by23 
 
- eliminating subsidies for necessities and taxes on luxuries, 
 
- privatizing state companies, eliminating keynesian measures, 
 
- lowering taxes, 
 
- repatriation of profits from investments, 
 
- devaluation of the national currency, 
 
- more power to stock-holders, less to trade unions, 
 
- higher labor productivity through automation/robotization, 
 
- primacy of economism as discourse. 
 
No doubt there is a logic behind this scheme, the logic of hyper-capitalism. The 
point is that the IMF is in the same position as Gosplan24 in the Soviet Union to 
implement their reductionist, highly ideological schemes, as public policy. They 
do not create synergies; they are that synergy, capable, with the World Bank, of 
sapping Third World countries for any promising young economists, making 
them parts of the synergy. They are also among the most global of 
organizations, but curiously intergovernmental as an instrument of privatization. 
There are some contradictions there that probably will mature. 
 
4. The intervening crisis variable: asymmetric purchasing power 
The basic facts are known from the latest Human Development Report 
published for the United Nations Development Programme,25 very much 
focussed both on basic needs and on distribution:26 
 
- three individuals have as much as the 48% poorest countries. 
 
- 1.3 billion make less than $1 per day (Indonesia 30 cents). 
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- the 20/20 ratio: 30 in 1960, 78 in 1991, 82 in 1994. 
 
- especially bad in LDCs with similar tendencies in MDCs. 
 
If we use the first two figures for the widening 20/20 gap we get a 3.13% growth 
rate for the gap. This is higher than the growth rate for GGP/capita: there is 
growth, but the top and bottom fifths pull away from each other at an even 
greater rate. 
 
What we badly need would be data on world purchasing power. The total 
purchasing power is probably increasing in the sense that there is a growing 
amount of free capital available for buying consumer goods.  But distribution is 
of the essence. 
 
Imagine the same amount of money available in two countries A and B with the 
same size of the population. In country A 10% of the population has 90% of the 
capital, in country B the capital is evenly distributed. In A the productive 
economy would focus on luxuries; in B on an equal mix of necessities, 
normalities and luxuries. Imagine you can make 5% profit on necessities, 50% 
on normalities and 500% on luxuries. Does that not mean more profit in country 
A? 
 
The problem with that reasoning is seen from this equation: 
 
Consumption = Consumptivity x No. of consumers x No. of hours 
 
There is an upper limit, even for the RRR, on what they can consume, even with 
very high consumptivity, the "propensity to consume". The task of advertising is 
to increase consumptivity. But the number of consumer-hours available is a 
limiting factor, a strong argument for a more egalitarian distribution. 
 
5. The dependent crisis cluster: gross imbalances/asynchronies Let us go more 
deeply into consumption, building on Say's idea about changing propensity to 
consume with increasing purchasing power. We have distinguished between 
four levels of consumption: 
 
Level 0: Below meeting basic needs: Misery 
 
Level 1: Just meeting basis needs: Poverty 
 
Level 2: Normal consumption: Normalcy 
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Level 3: Luxurous consumption: Luxury 
 
The assumption is that the point of gravity in the consumption pattern, the 
average level, increases with increasing purchasing power, except for 
fundamentalist puritans who stay at Level 1 or below, and the spend-thrift who 
tries a jump to level 3. 
 
Crisis I is what we have when a high and increasing part of the population lives 
in misery, at Level 0. If in addition we also have Crisis II, then there is no way 
out through investment in modern equipment for land farming or ocean farming. 
If in addition the other factors for the production of necessities, like 
land/soil/water, and seeds, are bought, polluted/diverted, and patented, then 
there is no traditional way out either.27 
 
If we now bring in consumption at Levels 1, 2 and 3 then the vicious circles 
operating, churning out crises, expand: 
 
increasing un/underemployment leads to 
 
decreasing purchasing power, leading to 
 
increasing un/underemployment leading to increasing misery, and 
 
decreasing purchasing power leading to increasing bankruptcy. 
 
The crisis is tapped out as ailing and dead people (Crisis I) and ailing and dead 
companies (Crisis III). However, company managers, CEOs are much better 
insured than ordinary people, sometimes with golden parachutes. They do not 
die; they are recycled before death. Yet their minor troubles make headlines in 
the corporate press. 
 
Let us then add two more levels to this Say-type analysis. What do people with 
much money do with their money when they have reached the limits to 
consumption, because there are only 24 hours available, it is difficult to make 
sleep that expensive,28 and the consumptivity has its upper limits for most? Even 
caviar and champagne, and skiing at Gstaad CH or Aspen CO, combined with 
some cruises, will draw a yawn after some time. Answer: the money is used to 
make more money, meaning a transfer from the productive economy (where 
consumption is such a problematic part) to the finance economy. That gives us: 
 
Level 4: Investment 
 
Level 5: Speculation 
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Level 6: Gambling 
 
There is an increasing level of risk/recklessness at work here. 
 
At level 4, investment, the money is earmarked for a company for which the 
capital-holder feels some responsibility beyond the profit motive, and some 
long-term commitment. 
 
At level 5, speculation, such as short-term, foreign portfolio investment (FPI), 
the link to any specific company is broken. The agent/computer searches for 
maximum profit at minimum cost, including time costs. The more "exotic", 
virtual, the financial object, the higher both risk and profit. We are now very 
close to gambling, but not yet quite there. 
 
At level 6, gambling, any link to the productive economy is broken. It is money 
for money, mediated by some chance device, loaded or not. Again, the higher 
the profit the higher the risk. The ultimate risk is total loss and major 
indebtedness, and the lonely shot at night. The crisis is tapped out as suicide and 
as the burden to the bereaved and the indebted left behind. 
 
The deficit in capital for the most needy, in misery, is a problem for themselves: 
they starve, die from under/malnutrition (some time ago at the rate of 40,000 
children per day). 
 
The deficit in capital for the less needy is also a problem for companies 
producing and marketing normalities and luxuries: they overproduce relative to 
demand and go bust, a minor problem for the CEOs, a major problem for the 
employees. 
 
The excess in capital for the super-rich, however, is less a problem for them, and 
more a problem for everybody else. For one thing, capital given to speculation is 
capital taking away from productive investment; as the family of any gambler 
(or of any other kind of addict) knows: capital given to gambling is capital taken 
from the family. In the macro-economy this means less capital for productive 
economy investment, including taking the risk of low return for any money 
invested in necessities for the needy. If they risk losing much in speculation, 
why not lose a little investing in necessities? The answers are obvious: the 
former risk comes with the possibility of great gains, the latter not. Moreover, 
misery is not very chic these days! 
 
Investing in production of normalities and luxuries, when the supply already 
outstrips the demand in at least a dozen major branches29 due to overproduction, 
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makes little sense even if it does not carry the stigma of investing in "needy" 
losers. In addition investment in the production that could help the needy, in a 
subsistence rather than growth economy, is labor and not capital intensive; a 
shadow from the traditional past. 
 
On top of that: investment is long term, time intensive, out of touch with the 
quick rhythms of post-modernity. Who wants to wait thirty years for a return 
when thirty seconds will do! 
 
Capital is made available for finance economy speculation to the tune of a $1.3 
trillion/day dynamism; by far outstripping another poor habit of humankind, a 
global military budget to the tune of $1000 billion = 1 trillion/year. It has been 
proven again and again that saving capital and investing it in the productive 
economy, when correctly done, can spur economic growth, if not economic 
distribution. "Trickling down", much praised but rarely seen, seems to need 
some plumbing of clogged pipes by the state. 
 
But high levels of speculation can take place unaccompanied by any productive 
economy dynamism. The incredible dynamism of the finance economy, with a 
DJI growth of 28% in 1997 as opposed to a productive economy growth of 1-
2%, indicates that little or no value was created. Value is shifted upwards, 
assuming gains by and large to be proportionate to the risks taken, meaning that 
"he who has (much) more will be given".30 
 
Instead of the neutral word-pair "productive/finance", used here, many authors 
use "real/virtual". This may be misleading. Anyone visiting a stock exchange 
witnesses a theater of the absurd, but only because it is unfamiliar to most of us. 
We associate the economy with means of production to produce, in return for 
the means of consumption; and we do not recognize these means in computer 
games at a level of abstraction (hedge funds, options, futures, derivatives) 
beyond comprehension. It looks more like a casino, place your money, win or 
lose. 
 
The problem is that the finance economy is not quite real, nor is it quite virtual. 
The coupling to the productive economy is weak, but it is not zero. Currencies 
carry the names of real countries, bonds of real states, stock of real companies; 
as opposed to Monopoly, or roulette/baccarat/what not in a casino. 
 
Take a stock as an example: an IOU, a redeemable credit given to a company. 
Those who buy it gamble on that company. The company shows a handsome 
profit after write-offs, dividends are paid, earning/price ratio is satisfactory. So 
far so good. 
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Then the rumor about that stock goes around and the finance economy takes off 
with its own logic, similar to any other economy: increased demand leads to 
increased value leads to increased demand.  The company can get good capital 
issuing more, but not too much more, supply = stocks, expanding production 
capacity, increasing the output/supply. Again, so far so good. 
 
Then comes the sundowner: the company has overinvested. The problem is not 
diminishing returns due to an imbalanced factor profile, but no return at all due 
to market saturation. Inventories exhaust the storage capacity. The cash flow 
dwindles to a trickle. Raw materials keep coming in to feed the production 
process. Even the usual ninety days to pay the bills prove insufficient. After 
some expansion of the delay comes the contraction period: COD; no cash, no 
delivery! What should not happen happens: the ships turn around, trying to sell 
their cargo elsewhere. The value of the stock suffers a steep decline. The 
company can no longer improve the cash flow by selling (overvalued) stock, and 
buying its own stock at more realistic prices is also out, given lack of cash. 
Others will buy, possibly with a take-over, hostile or not, in mind. 
 
If this happens to many companies in the same country the willingness to 
receive payment in the national currency will decrease and the value of that 
financial object is also in for a decrease, slow or steep, in other words 
devaluation. The ground is now prepared for foreign take-over, hostile or not. 
 
One way in which speculation differs from investment is in the neglect of 
concrete, real world, information. Speculation is based on how well stocks (or 
generally financial objects) are doing on the financial markets; investment is 
based on how well products are doing on product markets. Another difference is 
the speed of financial transactions. Checking for overproduction takes too much 
time. They all make the same mistakes. 
 
And yet the coupling is there, indicated in the example above from South Korea 
in late 1997. The companies in trouble were also chaebol, state enterprises 
susceptible to dirigisme and cronyism.  But they also had overproduction in 
common, probably much more important. The IMF used the situation to apply 
its standard prescription, not doubting the "wisdom/discipline of the market". 
How could they doubt their own God, when on a mission to exorcise Satan, the 
State, from the corporate realm? 
 
We have now located Crisis IV in the interface between overfinancing and 
overproduction. Just like Crisis I and II belong together, so do Crises III and IV. 
Speculation makes a lot of money available to companies doing well, but 
continues doing so long after the company has ceased doing well and may in 
fact do very badly. Supply side economics has its limitations if people simply do 
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not have the purchasing power. They may buy on credit (cards), and seek refuge 
from creditors in bankruptcy. But somebody will suffer badly down the line, and 
ultimately the overvalued company. The crunch is the cash flow that is where 
the famous "lack of confidence" ultimately shows up: the company is not 
deemed creditworthy. The company goes bust; the employees are added to the 
ranks of unemployed (1.7 mio in Korea after the crash, in a country with 
agriculture in shambles). 
 
The investor, close to the company, as opposed to distant and reckless 
speculators, has a clear algorithm: he would check the value of the stock against 
the quarterly reports and look at the branch as a whole for possible signs of 
saturation. The danger of overevaluation lies in the decline and fall, whether 
slow or quick. The former gives more time to accommodate; the latter cuts the 
agony short. The CEO, knowing the dangers of supply side economics, will 
have demanded parachute insurance. The investor has already done so in a 
major institution of capitalism: the limited (responsibility) company. 
 
How about the investor in a foreign country when all of this happens not only to 
one company but to several, and to the country itself in the sense of currency 
devaluations of 50-75%? Instead of accepting the applauded punishment and 
discipline of the market they demand "compensation or else no more 
investment" so that the sources of foreign capital will "dry up". The name of that 
insurance company is, of course, the IMF, but only in the sense of making loans 
available to the failed state so that the state can redeem the foreign investors and 
then service the loan.  Incompetence obviously is rewarded, not punished. The 
risk is carried by the labor-seller, not by the capital-holder! 
 
If the company stock is "out of synch" with performance, we would expect a 
crash, quick or slow. If the stock exchange of a country is "out of synch" with its 
performance, we would also expect a crash, quickly or dampened by official 
optimism and spreading over time, branches and companies. The disjunction 
between productive economy overproduction and finance economy 
overvaluation is at the root of the system. It is intrinsic to hyper-capitalism, the 
crises showing up at its weakest points.  
 
Thus, the early warning indicator would look at the ratios between the growth of 
the finance economy, dF/dt and the growth of the productive economy, dP/dt, in 
other words dF/dP. Another approach would be the ratio of the elasticities, 
dF/F/dP/P. Both could serve as indicators of imbalances; the optimistic 
hypothesis being that the imbalance is only an asynchrony and that the leading 
economy will fuel the lagging economy. The underlying hypothesis is that a 
healthy economy presupposes some kind of balance between the two given that 
the financial objects are supposed to have their productive economy 
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counterparts. Any such hypothesis, however, would have to allow for some 
margin of imbalance or asynchrony, especially given the long term tendency of 
stock exchanges to grow more than the productive economy (but not 10-15 
times more). 
 
Would it be better if the speculators cut the link to the productive economy, left 
the stock exchanges and their computer terminals, and settled in the world's 
casinos instead? 
 
Yes, in the sense that they and those who depend on them would have to carry 
the ultimate price (suicide) themselves, assuming that they gamble with their 
own money. Speculators seem to believe that they have31 a carte blanche to 
gamble with other people's money, letting them carry the burden of the losses, 
including landing them in misery (structural homicide). 
 
No, in the sense that speculation is not only gambling but some kind of 
investment that may also finance worthy enterprises the problem is that it goes 
out of hand. The problem beyond that is how to rein it in again. We may 
disagree about how to do that.  But there is hardly room for disagreement about 
an economic system that serves us so badly as hyper-capitalism. 
 
6. Conclusion and summary 
The reader is invited to look at the effort to summarize the argument in the 
charts on the next pages, adding some more context variables to this basically 
economic analysis. The flow of the charts is from left to right, with the 
underlying and the independent variables to the left, the intervening variable in 
the middle, and the dependent variables to the right. 
 
The ruling economic system in the world today is the system of the ruling 
region, the West, and carries, of course, the signature of the deep culture of that 
region, its cosmology, referred to as Occident I; the Occident in its expansion 
mode.32 
 
One basic aspect of that cosmology is the conceptualization of Time; equipped 
not only with the Idea of Progress, but with Beginning and End, Paradise, the 
Fall, the Darkness, the Light, and after the Progress the Crisis with the two 
possibilities: Catharsis or Apocalypse.  The two great prophets, Adam Smith and 
Karl Marx, both flashed the Light (blue light, and then red, but Light) after the 
Darkness of feudalism/mercantilism, and of capitalism, or of the entire past for 
that matter (equipped with the paradises of village markets and primitive 
communism, and the fall when humankind strayed away), promising the 
catharsis of capitalism and socialism/capitalism, equipping both with crisis.
22 
 
 
Non-occidental 
cosmologies 
(We-culture) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OCCIDENT  I 
cosmology 
(I-culture) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OCCIDENT II 
Cosmology 
(We-culture) 
subsistence 
economy 
(traditional) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
growth economy 
(modern) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
subsistence 
economy 
(traditional) 
SARKAR cycles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
anomie 
 
 
 
DOMAIN: 
globalization (mobile 
factors, products), 
privatization,  
increased labor 
productivity, IMF 
 
SCOPE:  
deepening  
(differentiation 
of products and 
financial objects) 
 
atomie 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SARKAR cycles 
massive corruption 
 
lack of confidence, 
devaluation of financial 
objects; 
massive debt & 
bankruptcies: 
- national 
- corporate 
- local 
- private 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poverty 
 
 
Misery 
 
 
massive violence 
 
 
massive migration 
 
 
 
KHALDUN cycles 
 
 
 
Deep 
Assumptions The Global Economy:  A Crisis Model
lack of solidarity, corruption, sect formation
Crisis 
manifestations 
(quick or slow)
IMF measures: 
no luxury taxes 
privatization 
repatriation 
devaluation 
no subsidies 
 
TOP:            
too much 
capital
global 
inequality
BOTTOM   
too little 
capital
to stockholders
Label9
lack of social fabric, violence, sect formation
Speculation
Investment
Luxury    
consumption
Normal     
consumption
Needs
Below            
needs
low growth 
of demand
Early warning 
signs:  rapid 
accumulation    
of financial 
instruments 
versus slow 
growth of the 
real economy
23 
 Non-occidental 
cosmologies 
(We-culture) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OCCIDENT  I 
cosmology 
(I-culture) 
 
 
 
 
 
      and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OCCIDENT II 
Cosmology 
(We-culture) 
First priority: 
subsistence 
economy 
(traditional) 
basic needs 
local level 
NGOs 
 
 
 
         and 
 
 
 
 
 
Second  
priority: 
growth  
economy 
(modern) 
state, world  
levels, TNCs 
 
 
         and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NGOs 
Local level 
basic needs 
subsistence 
economy 
(traditional) 
First priority 
SARKAR cycles: 
transcended, 
less division 
of labor 
 
        
 
 
       anomie 
 
DOMAIN: 
globalization (mobile 
factors, products), 
privatization,  
increased labor 
productivity, and 
localization with local 
money, banking, 
microcredit and appropriate 
technology 
 
SCOPE: deepening  
(differentiation 
of products and 
financial objects) 
and basic goods 
and services, low 
productivity sectors 
 
         atomie 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SARKAR cycles 
massive corruption: 
elimination 
 
Focus on Nature, 
Human (body, mind, 
spirit), Social  
freedom, equity), 
World development 
(peace) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poverty: elimination 
 
 
Misery: elimination 
 
 
massive violence: 
elimination 
 
massive migration: 
elimination 
 
KHALDUN cycles New 
forces: Local 
Authorities, NGOs; also 
boycotts 
 
 
 
Deep 
Assumptions
The Global Economy:  A Crisis Model
The Global Econmy: A Crisi Model
TOP:            
too much 
capital
global 
inequality
BOTTOM   
too little 
capital
to stockholders
Label9
Speculation
Investment
Luxury    
consumption
Normal     
consumption
Needs
Below            
needs
low growth 
of demand
Early warning 
signs:  rapid 
accumulation    
of financial 
instruments 
versus slow 
growth of the 
real economy
 
 
                                The Global Economy: A Human Model 
Lack of solidarity, corruption, sect formation: 
Local, NGO, communitarianism, local confederations 
TOP: 
some excess 
capital 
to stockholders/ 
workers in 
cooperatives 
Global 
dynamism 
and basic 
needs 
satisfied 
from workers/ 
stockholders in 
cooperatives 
 
BOTTOM: 
enough capital 
for a life in  
dignity 
Lack of social fabric, violence, sect formation: 
Local, NGO, communitarianism, local confederations 
Speculation: 
Restricted, taxed 
(Tobin) 
 
Investment: 
Micro-credit 
 
Luxury 
consumption: 
luxury taxes 
Normal 
consumption: 
Participatory 
Dialogue 
 
Needs:  
subsidies 
 
Below needs: 
scandal 
Basic needs  
and normal 
consumption 
purchasing power 
 
Wellbeing 
manifestations 
Global 
Human Rights; 
UN Economic 
Security Council 
 
24 
Smith psychologized, talking about the idiotizing effect of routine work; Marx 
politicized, equipping capitalism with more crises than Smith did, but then 
talked about counter-revolutions. Basically, however, they both promised 
Catharsis in the End. 
 
But the Occident is no stranger to Crisis. The Occident loves Crisis, feeds on 
Crisis. There is a whole pornography of crisis, highly exciting, on display in the 
media at all times. 
 
The mainstream ideology of economism guarantees crisis and will deliver 
provided the following four axioms are followed:33 
 
A1: there is no floor for economic activity, no "basic needs" 
 
A2: there is no ceiling for economic growth, no upper limit 
 
A3: there is the market steered by cost-benefit self-interest 
 
A4: the sum of one zillion egoisms is altruism (Invisible Hand) 
 
That the crisis guaranteed will be delivered also follows from one simple 
consideration: in a finite world any infinite move in the same direction will run 
against some wall, ie. into crisis. Either the move stops, or undergoes some 
curvature (Einstein). 
 
On the margin are alternative cosmologies within or outside the Occident, like 
Buddhism, substituting stability for progress and economically subsistence for 
growth. They are considered highly subversive by mainstream Occident, even 
feeble-minded. 
 
As growth continues the domain expands from the Center, through such 
mechanisms as globalization, privatization (so that the growth is not impeded by 
State concerns), and increased productivity (technology). And the scope deepens 
with an incredible variety of products and financial objects. 
 
The net result in the first run is increasing inequality at the global level, right 
now growing at an unparalleled speed. Assets are channeled away from labor-
sellers to capital-holders, the global upper classes indulge in luxuries, some 
investment and much speculation; the middle classes in normal consumption 
(and quite a lot of it); the global lower classes live in pandemic poverty and 
misery, possibly hearing voices about its eradication when dying, like plague 
and cholera patients before the advent of modern medicine. Snake oil is 
distributed by the IMF, as also to the patients of the pandemics of earlier ages. 
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The interface between rapid accumulation of financial instruments and sluggish 
growth of the productive economy because of underdemand or oversupply 
(depending on the viewing angle) spells crisis. The crisis then hits the global 
upper classes as lack of confidence in their own instruments, with accumulation 
of massive debt and bankruptcies at the national, corporate, and private levels. 
And it hits the global lower classes with blunt misery and its concomitants: 
massive violence (like crime in order to redistribute wealth) and massive 
migration, like one billion on the march by, say, the 2030s.34 
 
In the midst stands the IMF, extending more credit (debt) in return for 
"conditionalities" that add up to more economic freedom for the global upper 
classes, and more misery for the lower classes. A figure soon to fall, tragic in its 
absurdity. 
 
On the chart margins are some extra-economic contexts. 
First, it is inconceivable that two centuries of unbridled smithism, with its four 
axioms, in the very center of the West, geographically (Anglo-Saxon) and 
socially (the corporations), should not have a basic impact on the two 
constituents of social reality, culture and structure. If people are told that society 
they may end up not only doing so but even believing it. 
 
The result is anomie, a condition feared by sociologists: the absence of 
compelling norms beyond sheer egoism.  Solidarity and altruism are considered 
anachronisms; the social steering is increasingly by the pain/pleasure principle. 
One expression is massive corruption; another is massive sect-formation in 
search of new guidance. Nations can easily become such sects, hence the 
particularly vicious character of nationalism these days. 
 
Second, when the individual constitutes him/herself as the atom of social reality 
and the society as a noble/inert gas with no molecules, then the social fabric (el 
tejido social, le tissu social) will suffer, disrupt and fragment. I refer to that state 
of atomization as atomie.35 Combined with anomie we get a society of egoistic 
leibnizian monads, uncoordinated by any divine plan except its latter-day 
substitute: the "discipline of the market". The result is violence, why not 
eliminate people in the way, and sect-formation, to provide new social fabric; 
and then its mega-reflections, massive violence and migration. The latter comes 
more easily when the fabric has unraveled anyway. 
 
The cycles introduced by Khaldun and Sarkar are useful in this connection, 
among other reasons precisely because they offer cyclical perspectives instead 
of Western linearity ending with the apocalyptic crash (against the wall of 
finiteness) or the catharsis of Endzustand, j'y suis, j'y reste. 
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Sarkar combines in his thinking the concern with the vertical social dialectic 
between high and low, the exploited and/or repressed, and the horizontal 
dialectic between the three key elites: the military, the intellectuals and the 
merchants (kshatriyah, brahmin, vaishya). A key question is, who suffers so 
much as to be the next in line when any one of them is in power? According to 
Sarkar the military will be followed by the intellectuals (who have to be 
sustained by the state) and the intellectuals by the merchants. The net result is a 
circulation of elites, on top of people. 
 
That the military are intellectually uncouth, and that intellectuals struggle for 
freedom of expression (especially for themselves) is easily understood. 
 
That the intellectuals supported by the state come up with all kinds of state-led 
economies to please the hand that feeds them, at the expense of the free 
initiative of the private sector, is also easily seen. 
 
And, that the merchants are so exploitative in their search for market share and 
profit that the masses finally protest, with major upheavals, also rings true. 
 
Sarkar's point is that at that the merchants now run to the military, usually also 
with the support of the intellectuals, demanding that they do "something". That 
brutish "something" is then done, and later on the military will usually be 
blamed as the sole responsible. They may find it unjust. 
 
We are now living in the age of the merchant. Like at the beginning of the 
French revolution democracy and human rights (but civil-political more than 
social-economic rights) are in their interest. The synchronization of this age 
around the world, in widely disparate societies, has much to do with the collapse 
of dictatorial state planning (by intellectuals) in the socialist countries at the end 
of the Cold War, but also testifies to the general level of globalization of the 
planet (with the obvious thesis that the dialectic is artificially imposed on many 
societies). Of course, some intellectuals have survived the transition: those at the 
service of the merchants, glorifying their endeavors, helping them obtain their 
goals: the mainstream economists and the specialists of business administration; 
and, of course, the kinds of intellectuals needed for the production and 
distribution processes. Pure intellectuals are out, except for decorative purposes. 
 
During the age of the merchant globalizing, privatizing economies look as 
normal and natural as building alliances, preparing for a major nuclear holocaust 
and military rule (possibly with some politicos up front) during Cold or Hot 
Wars. That age of the military was also globalizing, being based to a large extent 
on coordinated military logistic capacity in alliances and counter-alliances. The 
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age of the intellectual was a short, but important aspect of the last part of the 
Cold War, and its short aftermath. Then came the merchants. And just as the 
ultimo ratio, the final argument, of the military is the gun, and of the intellectual 
the word, the final argument of the merchant is money. To argue with the gun is 
also known as violence, war, massacre; to argue with the money as corruption. 
To argue through words is a two-way dialogue, as opposed to the one-way order 
of the military and the one-way advertising of the merchant. Democracy is more 
easily accommodated during the age of the intellectual; and global markets 
during the age of the merchant. They combine in buying political to fund 
politicians. 
 
A basic point in Sarkar's theory is that no age is forever. They are all one-sided 
exaggerations, playing on one or a few human faculties instead of on the full 
panoply of human energies and inclinations. This also applies to the age of the 
merchant, which probably will be surprisingly short-lived. There will be 
political uprisings and individual migration all over, among other reasons 
because of the failure of the market system to distribute the fruits of the 
endeavors. Except, that is, under the assumption of a more balanced system 
capable of steering both the vertical and the horizontal dialectics toward some 
kind of harmony. The dream of good politics! 
 
Khaldun adds to this another cycle with four phases: the New replaces the Old; 
the New gets settled and flourishes; the next generation lives off the fruits; and 
the generation after that squanders what was once so shiny, incapable of 
renewal.36 Time has come for the new New, the Bedouins breaking the gates. 
 
This reads like the story of the October revolution and the Soviet rise, decline 
and fall; about four generations. No doubt Yeltsin looked to many as that new 
New, capable of renewal and a rapid transition to catharsis. In a very dualist37 
culture Gorbachev sounded like a messenger from the past. A deeper story 
would be that the Yeltsinites went straight to Khaldun IV, the era of corruption. 
And a still better perspective might be that they were just the last part of the 
Khaldun IV of the Soviet system, with anomie and atomie and their 
concomitants – massive corruption, violence and sect formation - rampant. 
 
Where are we now: 
 
Given that globalization synchronizes the national dynamics, at least at the top 
level? Something was ushered in, and not only in the ex-Soviet/socialist 
countries: hyper-capitalism. No doubt brilliant, shiny in its visible 
manifestations, such as the buildings of banks (remembering that "bank" is the 
first syllable in "bankruptcy"). There is also much gold behind what glitters. But 
it looks as if the system is equipped with an accelerator pushing us through 
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Khaldunian phases at a speed defying "generation". The name of that 
accelerator: the computer, with real time internet global co-existence. The name 
of the economic manifestation: speculation. 
  
Themes for further research: 
 
Prognosis: It will get worse: mass violence and migration. 
 
Therapy: Reverse all the above. But how? Building zones of subsistence?  
 
 
 
                                                          
Notes 
 
1 As an example of the incapacity of the high commands of the system to understand itself 
considers this quote from Dudley Fishburn, The Economist (from The World in 1998): "1998 
will be a year of prosperity. It will see the fastest rate of economic growth in a decade, despite 
shudders in the global stock markets. . . it is the world's poor who will benefit most". He 
actually also says, "Everywhere there will be peace. . . This peace and prosperity are almost 
entirely the result of America's leadership". A hagiography at this level is rare even on highly 
ideologized circles. 
Paul Krugman, in "Is Capitalism Too Productive", Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct 1997, pp. 79-94, 
concludes (p. 94) that "those who preach the doctrine of global glut are tilting at windmills, 
when there are some real monsters out there that need slaying" (among the "monsters": 
fatalism, giving up the idea of growth, or a balanced budget, protectionism). "What seems 
hard for Westerners to visualize is a world in which Chinese and Indonesians earn decent 
wages" (p. 92). What seems hard for Krugman to visualize is how economic growth can go 
hand in hand with rapidly deteriorating distribution. 
On the other hand, in his remarkable book The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Open Society 
Endangered (Public Affairs, 1998) George Soros goes a long way to sustain his major thesis 
that the market is not self-regulating, that "financial markets are inherently unstable", that 
"imposing market discipline means imposing instability" and that "if the global system is not 
torn apart by deflation or depression, it will be undone by political rebellion" (also see review 
by William Greider in The Nation, January 15 1999, pp. 25-27). 
2 The Gross Global Product as indicator is an obvious and welcome consequence of 
globalization: with the decreasing significance of the state as economic actor the GNP wanes 
in significance. But less disaggregation for states is no excuse for no disaggregation for class. 
3 Such as Standard & Poors also in New York, the Nikkei in Tokyo, the Hang Seng in Hong 
Kong, the Merval in Buenos Aires, etc. 
4 This particular concern goes beyond an affliction for young and not-so-young women to a 
civilizational problem: an obsession with the material/somatic as strong as the obsession with 
the transcendental/spiritual (am I saved, am I not) in other eras and parts of the world and the 
society. 
5 The poverty line is usually defined at an income below 50% of the average, with the obvious 
implication that to be poor in one country may be to be rich in another. Thus, to have another, 
more absolute concept, misery, is indispensable and the definition chosen here is in terms of 
basic needs satisfaction. 
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6 Compassion. 
7 For a superb exploration of Market = God; economists = priests, see Harvey Cox, "The 
Market as God; Living in the New Dispensation", Atlantic Monthly, March 1999. 
8 The phenomenon of an increasing gap between rich and poor also applies to China where by 
now the richest 1.3% of the families control 31.5% of the assets and the poorest 44% of the 
families control 3%. See Le Monde Diplomatique, January 1999, pp. 16-17. A very bleak 
picture is given in the famous China's Pitfall, by He Qinglian (Hong Kong: Minjing 
Chubanshe, 1998), reviewed in The New York Review of Books, October 8 1998 by Liu 
Binyan and Perry Link as "A Great Leap Backward?" (pp. 19-23). Thus, "by 1994 the 
disparity between rich and poor was already greater in China than in the United States. In that 
year the richest 20 percent of the US population owned 44.3 percent of the country's wealth, 
whereas in China the richest fifth owned 50.2 percent of the wealth; the poorest fifth in the 
US owned 4.6 percent of the wealth, in China 4.3 percent). 
9 Capitalism is embodied in the market; the market is about buying and selling; buying and 
selling is about assets; the more assets the more impact on the market; the more skewed the 
distribution of the assets the more skewed the impact on the market; the more skewed the 
impact on the market the more justified the expression Commando Capitalism. 
10 Known as Giffin goods, or positional goods: the buyer demands not only a car for 
locomotion but the status as a Mercedes (BMW, Acura, Lexus) owner, which means that the 
seller can, indeed has to, overprice the commodity to ration the access and more so the more 
demand there is. In the current shift toward luxury goods this phenomenon will probably play 
even more of a role than before. 
11 Or the "Black Tulip". Lester Thurow ("Asia: The Collapse and the Cure", The New York 
Review of Books, February 5, 1998, pp. 22-26) uses the Tulip Mania in Holland in the 1600s 
to illustrate what happens in a crash (p. 22): "At the top of Tulip Mania one black tulip bulb 
bought one of the row houses along the canals in Amsterdam.  That price was crazy, and 
everyone knew it, but prices were just as crazy when six tulips bought one house, and those 
who got out of the tulip market when it was 6 to missed a chance to multiply their wealth by a 
factor of six.  Every investor (no one thinks of himself as a speculator) imagines that he will 
be able to see the end coming and get out in time - but few do". The end came. 
12 For a theory of what could be called "bridgehead imperialism", see Johan Galtung, "A 
Structural Theory of Imperialism", Essays in Peace Research, Vol. IV, Chapter 13, 
Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1974.  The ease of communicative long distance control in real time 
makes the "center in the Periphery" dispensable, the local plantation overseers, the colonial 
rulers, the local bourgeoisie, the daughter company CEO. The "center in the Center" could 
base its rule on a very high level of fragmentation, very many small producers, and direct 
information control. 
13 To paraphrase the Bible: The State giveth, the State taketh, the name of the State be praised. 
But there has to be a balance between in and out. 
14 In an article summarizing the increase 1983-95 in the percentage of temporary workers 
(may work a full week but move from company to company) and part-time workers (less than 
35 hours a week, but may be permanent employees) the conclusion is: "Temporary workers 
typically receive benefits and pay comparable to those of full-time workers, but they do not 
have the job security. Parti-time workers tend to be paid less and receive fewer benefits". The 
problem is that the term "job" covers all categories, giving a false picture of the situation. 
15 Susan George, in "Pour la reforme du systeme financier international: A la racine du mal", 
Le Monde Diplomatique, January 1999, quotes Institute for Business Research and Tax 
Watch for an estimate of $12-50 billion the loss of revenue because TNCs declare income in 
other countries. In Die Woche, 2 October 1998, p. 17 we read the following:  "So ist im Laufe 
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der vergangenen Jahre das Steueraufkommen der deutschen Grossindustrie auf den 
niedrigsten Stand der Nachkriegszeit gesunken". 
16 For a view of globalization as [1] very old and [2] not brought about by the West after the 
"discoveries", see Andre Gunder Frank, ReORIENT, Berkely/Los Angeles/London: 
University of California Press, 1998. 
17 This ratio is usually given the other way round, as the price/earning ratio but makes better 
sense as earning/price ratio. 
18 The equivalents would be anything monetized, reducing "what is" to capital in one form or 
the other.  Physics, the model for economics as a science, has at least four: space, time, mass 
and an electric dimension.  And yet, what happened to "this stone is so nice to look at, and, 
when held, gives a good feeling the hand"? Answer: to some extent recovered by the arts. Is 
that a good answer, or would it have been better to enrich physics? What is the corresponding 
answer to economistic reductionism? 
19 Known to medical science as "side-effects" and it has taken centuries to have them 
recognized as part of the discourse. They are still with a few exceptions suppressed in 
economics. 
20 Nothing of any significance would happen to or in the Bretton-Woods institutions against 
the will of the US Congress; hence an obvious wish to have these institutions cover much of 
the activity of he United Nations Specialized Agencies as a whole. 
21 In South Korea these initials are interpreted as "I'M Fired". 
22 This, is of course not so obvious if we adopt a dialectic, probably more correct view of 
history: the reinvention and a new beginning for the State will come, if for no other reason 
because of its distributive roles. 
23 These are, with some variations, the conditions or "conditionalities" for credit. 
24 Gosplan = State Planning (Agency), responsible for the conception and execution of the 
Five Years plan (Petiletka) adopted by many countries all over the world, to the point of 
becoming one of the few contributions of the Soviet Union to world culture. 
25 Human Development Report, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998; for the United 
Nations Development Programme. Even a world class paper like the International Herald 
Tribune sacrificed only a paltry 40 column-lines on this major mirror of world reality. 
26 If we reduce the basic material needs to five, food-clothes-housing-health and education, 
then one might argue that the first three find their expression in number 4, health, and 
measure the health status as infant survival (100% - infant mortality) and the life expectancy. 
To this should then be added an indicator of education, for instance literacy, as a measure of 
access to symbolic interaction. Add it up and we get the kind of reasoning underlying the 
Human Development Indicator, HDI. 
27 And from this on, of course, massive starvation, massive migration and massive violence 
will dominate the picture. 
28 Well, that depends on the imagination.  An expensive bedroom with many-dimensional air-
conditioning and sound, light and fragrance conditioning would only be the beginning; 
imitating a morning in nature any place in the world, on command. The waterbed, suitable 
night clothing and cosmetics, and medication to regulate the sleep would follow. Then, for 
subliminal learning, a language course under the pillow, plugged into the brain, would follow. 
After some work, a sleep at $1,000/night should be marketable. 
29 Many branches are mentioned in various articles as suffering from overproduction as result 
of overinvestment: cars, consumer durables, beer, cement ("Assessing the Downside of 
Foreign Direct Investment" by Philip Bowring, IHT, 30-31 January 1999); cars, datachips, 
steel, chemicals, computers, frigidaires, clothes, videos, washing machines ("Hva med 
overkapasitet?" by Diedrik Kemkers). Then, there is the case of the 80 million cars chasing 50 
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million buyers, see R. J. Barnet and John Cavanagh, "A Globalizing Economy: Some 
Implications and Consequences", in Mazlish, B. and Bultjens, R., eds, Conceptualizing Global 
History (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993). 
As a special case take the economy of a rich country, Norway, now also in economic 
difficulties. Peder Martin Lysestol sees four major factors: [1] increasing dependency of the 
whole economy on oil, [2] increasing oil production in spite of overproduction on the world 
market, [3] investment of oil revenues in the finance economies of 31 different countries with 
a drop in interest from 12.3% to 2.1% from the first to the second quarter of 1998 alone; [4] 
an increasing focus on Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe as markets for Norwegian export in 
general. Evidently Norwegian decision-makers are not well informed about the world 
economy. 
That one implication is deflation is picked up by relatively few, an exception being Gary 
Shilling, "the deflation guru of Wall Street" (see IHT, 30-31 January 1999). He mentions 
retail prices in China, Sweden, Switzerland and Japan; USA should have been added, but "the 
Consumer Price Index is inflated by at least one percentage point." If the deflation could 
"catch down" with the decrease in purchasing power lower down in society then fine for the 
consumer, but companies would go bust. 
30 Robert J. Samuelson, in "Look Out, the Great American Boom Cannot Last", IHT, 
December 30 1998, quotes Standard & Poor's Index of 500 stocks that went up 27% in 1998 
(as of Christmas Eve), following 34% in 1995, 20% in 1996 and 31% in 1997. The second 
thing that cannot last, according to him is "the national shopping spree": "In 1998 - consumers 
spent nearly 100 percent of their current incomes".  And he mentions amazon.com as an 
example of a highly valued stock in spite of the fact that "for the first nine months of 1998 it 
lost $78 million ($1.60 a share) on sales of $357 million". 
31 As Surendra J. Patel expresses it in his "Financial Turbulence in Southeast Asia: Seeking 
Solutions", World Affairs, Jul-Sep 1998, pp. 65-78: "It is revealing that the total "rescue" 
package offered by the IMF under its stiff conditionalities comes to about the same sum 
which the foreign investors insisted on being paid by mid-1998. Obviously, the IMF package 
was intended to rescue foreign investors, and not the East Asian countries. Here is a re-
enactment of what happened in Mexico" (p. 73). Or Brazil for that matter: "The chief 
beneficiaries of these procedures will be U.S. bankers, who hold much of Brazil's estimated 
$140 billion of short-term debt. For their part, the U.S. banks have been unwilling to provide 
Brazil some breathing room by converting their short-term loans to long-term ones - perhaps 
because they are betting the IMF-U.S. plan will step in and absorb the risk" (In These Times, 
November 29, 1998). 
32 For an elaboration, see Johan Galtung, Peace By Peaceful Means, London/Thousand 
Oaks/New Delhi: SAGE, 1996, Part IV, "Civilization Theory". 
33 Jim Duffy, "A Fundamentally Flawed Economic Script" summarizes the economic script in 
three similar axioms (jcmd@hotmail.com): [1] Human needs are nonexistent. [2] Human 
wants are infinite and insatiable. [3] The essence of human motivation is self-interest. 
34 One of the very few saying the obvious is Dieter Brauer, the editor of Development & 
Cooperation (No. 5/1998, p. 3): "It is he poor who are footing the bill. In Indonesia, the 
current daily minimum wage is 4,400 rupiah or about 30 US cents. Reports say that even this 
low wage is not always paid by employees. The poor who had no hand in the making of the 
crisis should not be the only ones to suffer". Pious wish! Chances are they will be met by 
water-cannons, tear gas and bullets, not a decent economic system. Manuel Castells 
(UNRISD News, No. 19, Autumn/Winter 1998), in "Informational Capitalism and Social 
Exclusion", quotes the expanding 20/20 ratio and the fact that "extreme poverty, or misery - 
usually defined as the proportion of people who are below 50 percent of the poverty line - is 
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the lot of the fastest growing segment of the poor population in almost every country. And as 
a significant number of people are being excluded from access to regular jobs, they are 
moving into the shop floor of crime. It is urgently necessary to reverse the downward spiral of 
exclusion and to use information and communication technologies to empower humankind". 
Agreed. The system, however, will use exactly those technologies to control humankind. 
As a third example take John Naisbitt's Megatrends (Warner Books 1984), the chapter "From 
a National Economy to a World Economy", pp. 53-79. Not one single word about the 
impending crisis, already highly visible at the time of publication (the USA crisis, the 
Mexican crisis in 1982, for instance). The conclusion is in terms of increasing global 
interdependence with no single word lost on the plight of the poor but with a warning: To 
understand the U.S. economy today we have to look at the economic health of each of the 
states and each of the business sectors" (p. 73). True, macro-economics has its limitations. But 
where are people?  Had he given some attention to that he would never conclude with the 
naive "World Peace Through World Trade: Instead of resisting economic interdependence, we 
should be embracing it wholeheartedly. In my view it is our great hope for peace". 
Unfortunately, people not only states also enter in the equation. The current system is a 
massive war on common people. 
35 See Johan Galtung, "On the Social Costs of Modernization. Social Disintegration, 
Atomie/Anomie and Social Development", Development and Change, April 1996, Vol. 27, 
No. 2, pp. 397-413. 
36 The Japanese politician Shintaro Ishihara, in his book The Economic War Declaration, sees 
the "Asian Crisis" more as a very deliberate strategy by the USA to destroy sufficient 
economic capacity in Asia, including Japan, for the USA to take over collapsed companies. 
The now classical case would be the take-over of the brokerage firm Yamaichi by Merrill 
Lynch, partly brought about when the rating agencies Standard&Poor and Moody lowered the 
rating for Yamaichi. My point is, however, that such things will happen even when not 
intended, and will also hit the USA, as it did in the 1970s and 1980s when Chrysler needed a 
major government bailout, New York went bankrupt, the Savings and Loans system collapsed 
and had to be bailed out by the tax-payers, property prices were falling all over and on top of 
that there was a stock market crash 15 October 1987. 
Is this a case of Japan unable to renew itself, easily taken over by innovative Americans and 
Bedouins? Or, is the problem that the Americans deep down know the shortcoming of their 
own economy and substitute aggression for innovation? After all, there is a handwriting on 
the wall, uncomfortably similar: 
Contemplate the following headlines (from the archives of the Japan Times (& Mail, October 
27 1929; deadline Washington, October 24 1929): "Hoover Assures American Trade is on a 
Sound Basis" - "Bottom is knocked off the New York Stock Exchange" - "All Prices Drop" - 
"President Declares Reports Show Employment Situation is Good". Thus, whenever there is s 
drop on the stock market the US media come out with similar statements, and with interviews 
with people in the street, ten out of ten declaring that they have faith in the economy. The 
doctrine of the self-fulfilling prophecy (Thomas-Znaniecki) has some, but not unlimited 
validity. Of course, nobody will sustain the thesis that there will be an exact replay of October 
1929. Thus, my thesis is that the crisis is already there and that much selective blindness is 
needed not to see it. 
37 The price paid for seeing the world in terms of only two possibilities, "either communism 
or capitalism" and "communism does not work", was very high indeed: Michel 
Chossudovsky, "Global Poverty in the Late 20th Century", (chossudovsky@sprint.ca) offers 
the following comparison between Nazi-Germany's attack on the Soviet Union during the 
Second world war and the workings of capitalism: "following the German occupation of 
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Byelorussia and parts of the Ukraine in 1941, and the extensive bombing of Soviet industrial 
infrastructure the Soviet GDP had by 1942 declined by 22 percent in relation to pre-war 
levels.  In contrast, industrial output in the former Soviet Union plummeted by 48.8 percent 
and GDP by 44.0 percent between 1989 and 1995 according to official data, and output 
continues to fall". Of course, the mechanical impact of sustained bombing hits the material 
aspects of the economy; jungle capitalism hits its inner workings. 
A morbid consequence of the economic catastrophe in Ukraine, as in ex-Soviet Union in 
general: "elderly people in eastern Ukraine who have not received pension payments for five 
months have been offered free coffins as an alternative" (Transition, August 1998). 
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